Lecture given by the Director General of the DIS, Prefetto Giovanni De Gennaro, at the Link Campus University of Malta, Rome, on 29 January 2010

I am very grateful for the invitation to participate in the opening day of the Master in Intelligence Studies at the Link Campus University of Malta.

Before sharing my considerations on the relationship between intelligence and national security with you, let me extend my greetings to Professor Vincenzo Scotti. He is an old friend of mine since I worked with him when he was Minister of the Interior in a very difficult and delicate time of our republican history.

When Professor Scotti called and invited me to give a speech opening this course of studies on intelligence, at first I declined his invitation. I thought that the time had not come yet to draw conclusions on the implementation of the law reforming the Italian intelligence system. Then, I yielded to his kind requests considering his reasons. Actually, this is a good opportunity to take stock – a sort of mid-term review on the status of Italy's intelligence system almost three years after the reform was enacted, bringing about a profound change in terms of structure and organization.

The audience today is undoubtedly competent and allows me to make an exception to the golden rule of confidentiality binding someone having, as I have, the task of coordinating intelligence activities for the protection of the Italian Republic.

This is true not only because this is an audience of insiders, who are thus able to evaluate my considerations with a critical, dialectical, yet constructive attitude, but also for their academic approach. So it will be possible to translate my empirical considerations – based on and resulting from working experience – into scientific terms.

In other words, I will confine myself to put forward my doubts, my considerations, my difficulties, and my proposals. I believe that they can be a useful basis for study and research both to find scientifically suitable solutions and bring about better conditions so that the national intelligence system can make the quality leap required to ensure wealth and security for a country such as Italy confronted with the challenges of the third millennium.

Cold war times belong to history and seem so far away. Back then, the best intelligence resources from both blocs used to be almost exclusively engaged in acquiring information and penetrating the enemy's military defences to anticipate their moves and ensure suitable protection in terms of deterrence as well.

Nowadays, intelligence targets involving security at a global level are different and more complex.

Some of them are pressing and oppressive as to direct perception of single events. I refer to the safeguard from the threat of international terrorism that, after September 11, has deeply affected our daily life too.

Citizens commenting, "Better naked than dead" reveal their absolute need for protection. This allows us to understand how deeply rooted in each of us this need is now.

Other intelligence requirements are less immediate to perceive as they belong to the collective, rather than individual sphere of risk. Yet, they are aimed at preventing more insidious and disruptive dangers at a global level.

For example, it is now a common opinion that the major challenge for intelligence in the third millennium is cyber security. Cyber security will be the arena where intelligence agencies from the most developed countries will be confronting. As the web is affecting the habits and behavioural patterns of individuals, companies, critical infrastructures, communications, economic and financial systems, intelligence agencies will have to take into account the vulnerabilities of their respective national systems. If we consider the incalculable damage a large-scale cyber attack may cause, cyber security will have then the same value as nuclear protection and perhaps even more. Who among us does not recall the anxious wait for the dreaded effects of the millennium bug? As a matter of fact, that was just a possible, unplanned risk, as well as natural and physiological ones.

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Hence, new challenges arise along with new intelligence requirements to carry out new defensive approaches.

Italian legislators were not distracted and blind to new crisis scenarios and were not afraid to clearly indicate the tasks of the renewed national intelligence system – entrusted with defending "the independence, integrity and security of the Republic" from any possible threat, varied and asymmetric, aiming at damaging "Italy's political, military, economic, scientific and industrial interests", as well as "the internal security and the underlying democratic institutions as established by the Constitution" –  if subject to subversive, criminal and terrorist attacks.

 

Legislature entrusted intelligence with extremely complex tasks and moved the game on to a new level, with new rules and players.

Thus, it becomes natural to ask ourselves whether we are all ready and culturally prepared to face new challenges, whether we are certain that everybody shares the need for adequate intelligence, so that political decision makers can identify the most appropriate defence techniques.

In other terms, how many among us are aware of the need for an intelligence system interacting with a world no longer divided into two opposed military blocs, where the economy is globalized, processes are often unpredictable because of their nature and scope, war conflicts are asymmetric, and threats are coming from different risk sources?

How many among us are fully aware that, being confronted with such a wide and complex scenario, intelligence must change its nature and that information collection should be radically renewed in terms of human and technological resources, operational methods, alliances, behavioural patterns, reliable relations, as well as the ensuing responsibilities, control mechanisms, and, last but not least, the consideration of public opinion regarding intelligence services and their agents?

If these preliminary remarks have some foundation, then I am in the right place to present my considerations. It is evident that we are facing a real cultural revolution, at the end of which the current relationship "intelligence/national interests" should be profoundly renewed, by means of a process removing long-standing mistrust, unjustified fears, and obsolete judgements on the inefficiency or – even worse – uselessness of intelligence.

If this did not occur, it would mean that we have failed to interpret the guidelines set forth by the reform law, and thus to implement it.

At the end of this process, therefore, as the best Anglo-Saxon tradition taught us, it is fundamental to raise awareness that modern and effective intelligence – providing reliable elements for evaluation and timely, appropriate information – is a quality indicator for a modern country, ready to respond to new challenges with well-timed and effective decisions – an indicator as trustworthy as other more widely recognized ones, like unemployment or literacy rates, or gross domestic product.

If these considerations have some grounds, I think we can draw a first, positive conclusion and say that the reform legislators hit the mark when, envisaging this renewal, they entrusted the DIS – a coordinating agency in charge of oversight, but without any operational role in the system – with the task to promote a new culture of security.

Legislators underlined the notion of "culture" to express the need to extend the speculative field related to intelligence, so that the debate on security dynamics may come out of the inner circles where it is confined today, which basically correspond to insiders. Undoubtedly, this is the right way to "promote and diffuse the culture of security".

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We are getting to the crux of the matter which is essential to promote a deep-impact reform.

The question is, who really knows the actual function of an intelligence system and how much do they know about it?

Moreover, who really knows what the mission of an intelligence system is about, who knows its potential and limits, what to ask from it and what can be obtained from its institutional activities?

Allen Dulles, a great expert in intelligence matters, director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961, commenting the requests from his Government said, "The problem of our field of activity is that politicians mistake us with God."

It's not so long ago that Dulles said these words, it was in the 1950s-1960s, yet the history of intelligence dates back to more distant times. Way back in 500 B.C., Sun Tzu in his "The Art of War" said, "What enables the wise sovereign and good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."

And here lies the problem. If it is true that by culture of security we mean the relationship that the collectivity has with national security, its values and the entities in charge of it, we should ask ourselves why, when reading the press and watching TV, the only notion of intelligence services reaching the public opinion is the "institutionalization" of a negative concept, simplified in the most widespread definition of  "deviated secret services" .

If we imagine that this is the real starting point for the long path leading to the correct "promotion and diffusion of the culture of security", we risk trivializing any reasoning. It is true, however, that the start is uphill and with some handicap as well.

A handicap start, but above all a much-needed start which can no longer be postponed – not only for the formal implementation of a law provision, but because, I repeat, the challenges to security in the third millennium do not leave us any other alternative.

It is up to us, therefore, to create the conditions for a different response, in line with reality. And we can do this following a virtuous path in terms of both operational concreteness and knowledge. This is the only way for us to make the notion of transparent, reliable intelligence the heritage of a widespread and shared culture, ready to safeguard the common good, integrated in the social dynamics of the country, inspired to democratic values and at the same time prepared and ready to take up and overcome new challenges.

To this end, a key role will be played by specialists, who will organize resources and operational methodologies according to the standards set by the law. At the same time, the academic community will play an important role, as it can contribute to define the effectiveness and credibility of the intelligence system according to shared scientific criteria, eliminating any doubt and common place, both in the public opinion and political decision-makers.

Further proof that legislators were aware of this need lies in another innovative notion envisaged in the same provision – institutional communication.

The idea of legislators is clear – both activities are interconnected. On the one hand, without institutional communication it is impossible to promote and diffuse the culture of security. On the other, without an adequate culture of security, the institutional communication of the Italian intelligence will be strongly limited in terms of contents and impact.

The third element – another novelty introduced by the reform law – is the training program shared by the whole intelligence system. The Instruction School was established at the DIS, providing the training to staff working in the intelligence systemin a harmonic and unified manner. It is also evident that the School will become a key factor for the growth and diffusion of the culture of security.

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So, let's try and give a response to the doubts we raised to verify if the needs identified by legislators were really founded.

Suffice it to see yesterday's press to corroborate this consideration. In a article we read, "… in the Italy of massacres gone unpunished and deviated secret services, where every opaque affair draws on itself the suspicion – sometimes well grounded – of intelligence services' unfair involvement…".

And again, "Secret services as such are a deviation from the principle of lawfulness. They are a sort of authorized criminal conspiracy". Or, "Ontologically, the intelligence man is not democratic, because his own function is not."

With all due respect for other people's opinions, which is a value of freedom, it is however legitimate to ask oneself on which principles and scientific research such statements are based. They are so harsh and liable to affect institutions fundamental – as stated by the Constitution– to the defence of the Republic. And if, as I hope, such study and research prerequisite exist, I still wonder in which wide context of scientific debate they have been confronted and verified.

On the contrary, I recently read the writings of a French intelligence expert, EricDenécé, director of the "Centre français de recherche sur le renseignement".

Decéné wrote, "For more than 20 years that I've been studying intelligence, I've been hearing intelligence outsiders talk about services' autonomisation and their influence, or even manipulation of politicians. In France, like in the majority of countries, these border on pure fantasy. In democracies, whether conspiracy theorists like it or not, I&S services are no halls of power and do not have their own policies."

Besides the legitimate question about who is right, it is clearly necessary to reach a shared notion of culture of intelligence based on definite scientific foundations. In addition, such notion must clear the ground from clichés and prejudices associated with the past, and ineffectual for the standards that must inspire effective and reliable modern intelligence services to take up future security challenges.

The academic community will have to play a leading role in this difficult area of study and research. It will have to be involved because for some time now intelligence requirements have exceeded mere public and institutional needs.

Once again, in order to underline our delay, I use the example of France, which, in turn, lags behind the Anglo-Saxon world.

Up to about 20 years ago, the situation in France was pretty similar to that in Italy. Since the early 1990s, however, the interaction between intelligence and academic community has developed more and more incisively, as the economic players increasingly felt the need for integrating intelligence into the productive and entrepreneurial process.

Over time the process opening the French university system to intelligence subject-matters has continued in different ways. It has been delayed and accelerated, but it has never stopped. A few days ago, an academy for intelligence specialists was founded.

This decision falls within the reform of national security organizations promoted by President Sarkozy. It is designed to assign the intelligence system an appropriate role, to adjust defence instruments to new challenges according to scientific standards, so that intelligence can play its role while enhancing both its potential and reliability.

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Then, one may wonder, and what about Italy?

In Italy, in order to implement the law, we launched the institutional communication project.

The first step was to set up the website, whose initial goals are simple: explaining the reform and illustrating the basics of the "New intelligence system for the security of the Republic", providing services and information on the system's institutional activities, as well as documentation about intelligence-related subject-matters. This was a first start. Then we launched an initiative to collect resumes online in an attempt to make the connection with citizens more direct and to open them to a world whose main defect so far had been perhaps self-referentiality. We received over seven thousand resumes, and many emails showing us not only great interest for intelligence agencies, but also that such interest comes from deep-seated motives, and not just from the eagerness to get a job. So we realized that many – among both the young and the less young – perceive working for the security of the national collectivity as a value per se, making it a priority choice over other jobs.

This is a first, concrete sign that it is possible to create a new relationship between civil society and intelligence. Will, professionalism, and brains are out there, ready and willing to engage in ensuring national security. And if they won't be able to do so working directly in our agencies, they may have the same opportunity in other contexts such as corporate, academic and cultural environments. The motives underlying many emails we received through our website appear to be so strong that we believe they will keep inspiring the senders for long.

I dwelt on these considerations and this subject because I firmly believe that a clear and well-defined approach is the prerequisite to create and operate the "national security system" at its best. Recently, Mr. Letta –  the Undersecretary of State delegated by the President of the Council of Ministers to oversee intelligence matters – pointed out that the notion of "system" is the fundamental key to interpret the success of our work, because to be able to work as a system means to diminish the separateness between different organizations, and between these and the national system in which we work – I'm still quoting Mr. Letta – "to pursue the common aim coinciding with salus rei publicae itself". I leave to you to judge if all this may take place without a common culture of security.

Culture of security and institutional communication are therefore the two main instruments that the reform law provided us to accomplish a large-scale institutional mission: reducing the separateness of the intelligence system wherever it is possible and overcoming the old culture of suspicion. After all, if we take a closer look at things, our actual, most important challenge lies exactly here – to take the "leap" or make the "change" between these two cultures, these two opposed ways of living the relationship between intelligence services and national community. The reform's success will be gauged especially in this context. But another important factor will be also the relationship between intelligence and political decision makers.

If we look at the new law, we immediately realize that there are three fundamental innovations. The first is the concentration of all the political responsibilities related to security intelligence in the hands of the President of the Council of Ministers. As a result, like in most western democracies, the directors of the intelligence system are directly and exclusively answerable to the head of the Government and no longer – as it occurred before the reform – to single ministers. The new organizational approach is more straight-line, makes it easier to identify responsibilities and, ultimately, facilitates a better relationship between those in charge of the intelligence system and those responsible at a political level. Functional to this new approach is the second innovative element, i.e. the strengthening of the Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic (CISR). It assists the President of the Council of Ministers in overseeing national security agencies.

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Within this collective body, the coordination of intelligence requirements can take place at the highest level, thus ensuring the first condition for quality intelligence to meet Government's requirements. As the Committee also takes decisions regarding "the lines and general goals of security intelligence policy", we can see that this is the arena where the relationship between intelligence and politics comes into play. In simpler words, at CISR level, ministers can decide which information to ask from intelligence services and how, and they can also share considerations on the intelligence obtained. This sharing process is of vital importance. It gives our intelligence agencies the opportunity to verify and enhance their contribution to Government in terms of both contents and presentation. For some aspects, the CISR might be defined as a high-level laboratory for the culture of security.  The third innovation is the substantial strengthening of Parliamentary scrutiny powers – now entrusted with the renewed Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR). This committee is a body comprising five members of the Senate and five of the Chamber of Deputies. By law, it is chaired by a member of the opposition.

The COPASIR is not only the fundamental balancing hub of the whole system, but it is also the best way to overcome the old culture of separateness, and, at the same time, to keep the highest standard of confidentiality. The scrutiny process has already started and I might say that what appeared to be ties are now turning into important opportunities for enhancing our work. This corroborates underlying data in which I firmly believe: the scrutiny over national security intelligence must be, first of all, political – as parliamentary oversight is in its highest meaning. This is what the nature of the interests at stake requires – which may coincide with the survival of the national community as a free and sovereign community – as well as the type of possible sanctions, which have to be political too, as both the old law no. 801 of 1977 and the recent reform law provided for. In brief, I can say that these three innovative elements concur in creating the conditions for an enhanced relationship between those responsible for intelligence and decision-makers. Such improved relationship comes from a clearer, straight-line distribution of tasks, responsibilities, powers, oversight and operational dynamics, although some step forward should be taken in this latter field.

In conclusion, I'd like to tell you that thanks to the reform we have now all the instruments to face the difficult task of intelligence in the third millennium. Much is up to us working at every level of the Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic – much is entrusted with our ability to accept the changes imposed by times, to open as much as possible to the relationship with the elites of our country, to recognize ourselves and let us be recognized as a system in the system – the intelligence system for the security of the Republic as a living component of a bigger system – Italy itself. To this end, we must work all together keeping in mind the goal of a loyal, transparent relationship with the political leadership. In such a relationship, we acknowledge the basic condition for the success of our intelligence aimed at the security of the Republic. In this perspective, we must be all strongly committed. And it is for this reason that today I get particular satisfaction from extending my greetings and encouragement to a group of experts that can be motivated fellow travellers along the routes of commitment at the service of national security.

Thank you. 

 

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